The Problem With The National Intelligence Estimate

When the N.I.E. was released the other day it provided a strong sense of relief. Our joint intelligence bureaucracy had concluded that Iran was no longer attempting to build a nuclear weapons capacity. Whew! Now, assuming this N.I.E. was a product of a reorganized and chastened intelligence infrastructure that was better than the one that advised that WMD in Iraq was a slam dunk, there would be no need to consider military action against Tehran until well after the departure of Bush and Cheney.

Could it even be possible that our adventure into Iraq in 2003, and ongoing, prompted the Iranians to pull back a little out of fear of the cowboy in D.C.'s capacity to cross their border with our tanks?

Then we had the spectacle of George Bush going quickly before the cameras to try to explain to us and the world that Iran was still busily enriching uranium and could quickly restart their bomb building once the fissile material reached weapons grade. Well, he tried to say that, but did it in his usual smirking Bushspeak, which can no longer convince anyone.

In today's Times, Tom Friedman has it exactly right. The way the N.I.E. was written, with its emphasis on the cessation of bomb building and its relegation of the continuing enrichment activities to the depths of the report led everyone to get the full picture wrong.

The Gulf Arabs feel like they have this neighbor who has been a drug dealer for 18 years. Recently, this neighbor has been very visibly growing poppies for heroin in his backyard in violation of the law. He’s also been buying bigger and better trucks to deliver drugs. You can see them parked in his driveway.

In the past year, though, because of increased police patrols and all the neighbors threatening to do something, this suspicious character has shut down the laboratory in his basement to convert poppies into heroin. In the wake of that, the police declared that he is no longer a drug dealer.

“But wait,” say the Gulf Arabs, “he’s still growing poppies. He was using them for heroin right up to 2003. Now he says he’s in the flower business. He’s not in the flower business. He’s dealing drugs. And he’s still expanding the truck fleet to deliver them. How can you say he’s no longer a drug dealer?”

Sorry, say the police. We have a very technical, legal definition of drug-dealing, and your neighbor no longer fits it.

That’s basically what has happened between the U.S. and Iran — just substitute enriched uranium for poppies. Now, Bush officials are trying to tell everyone: “No, no, Iran is still dangerous. You have to keep the coalition together to get Tehran to stop enriching uranium.” But in a world where everyone is looking for an excuse to do business with Iran, not to sanction it, we’ve lost leverage. Everyone in the neighborhood can smell it — and it worries them.

The problem this creates is that it potentially deprives the US and its few remaining allies of the only leverage we had that might force concessions from the Iranian government if the next President chooses to engage them in talks. As Friedman puts it:

As I have said before, I’d rather see Iran go nuclear, and contain it, than have the Bush team start another Middle East war over this issue. But I’d much prefer a negotiated end to Iran’s enrichment. Right now there is a silly debate: Should we negotiate with Iran “conditionally” or “unconditionally” on this issue. Wrong question. The right question is should we enter such negotiations with or without leverage.

If we sit down with the Iranians without the leverage of a global coalition ready to impose tighter and tighter economic sanctions — should Iran not halt enrichment — we’ll end up holding a stuffed animal. The peculiar (obtuse?) way the N.I.E. on Iran was framed has deprived all who favor a negotiated settlement of leverage.

“It was the C.I.A. doing its job of collecting intelligence really well and presenting it really badly,” said Mr. Samore.

Now we have to depend on — Oh, my God! — President Bush to persuade the world to read the whole N.I.E. and see it in a balanced perspective. As I’ve also said before: Some things are true even if George Bush believes them, but good luck getting anyone to buy that anymore.

Strategic Diplomacy Played Out In The NY Times

The lead article in today's print editions of the NY Times is headlined, "Iran Strategy Stirs Debate at White House." The article, by Helene Cooper and David E. Sanger, reports that a debate is ongoing in Administration circles between those who favor a push for firm diplomatic pressure on the Iranian government to end its development of fissionable material and those who favor a military strike on those nuclear facilities.

Cooper and Sanger report that their sources are "officials at the State Department, White House and the Pentagon who are on both sides of the debate, as well as people who have spoken with members of Mr. Cheney’s staff and with Ms. Rice. The officials said they were willing to explain the thinking behind their positions, but would do so only on condition of anonymity."

The core of the debate is between those in the Cheney camp who want to establish a "red line" beyond which the Iranians would not be allowed to proceed, even if military action is the only way of interfering with their progress. The Rice camp want to press the European nations to increase the economic pressures on Iran, hoping that sufficient pressure will encourage the Iranians to come to the table with an offer that would assure no development of nuclear weapons.

I find it difficult to read this article without wondering aloud if the editors and writers at the Times weren't certain that they were being used as a conduit to ratchet up the drumbeat of the hawks as a means of motivating the Europeans to act in order to avoid an American or Israeli air strike. There seems to be "managed coincidence" of public debate over this issue.

As the Times piece mentions, Norman Podhoretz in the current Commentary, features a lead piece entitled, "The Case For Bombing Iran." His conclusion is that Iran's intentions are nothing less than the building of a nuclear arsenal to wipe out Israel, dominate the Middle East and its oil resources, and extending the power and influence into Europe. In Podhoretz' view, the only means of stopping this important front in what he views and World War IV is military action.

Leaving aside the very important question of the likelihood of the success of such military action and our ability to counter any Iranian counter moves, Podhoretz and other hawks like William Kristol and John Bolton are raising a chorus of cries for armed steps against Iran. At the same time State Department and Treasury officials, according to the Times, "...have been trying to use the mounting conservative calls for a military strike to press Europe and Russia to expand economic sanctions against Iran."

In fact, in this weeks US News and World Report, Dennis Ross, former mideast negotiator for both the Clinton and first Bush Administrations, argues that:

It's time to go outside the Security Council and persuade our European allies to move beyond incremental pressures and actually cut their economic lifeline to Iran such as the billions of dollars in credit guarantees to companies doing business with Tehran.

How to convince the European Union? Statecraft. Convey to the Europeans that unless economic pressure is dramatically increased now, the use of force to stop the Iranian nuclear program will become more, not less, likely. To make economic pressure more palatable to the Europeans, let them know that once the new penalties are in place, we will join them in direct negotiations with Iran—something they believe is the key to overcoming the crisis with Iran.

Sounds familiar, doesn't it.

The real question for this period in world communications and diplomacy is whether or not such plain ploys, conducted in the open, can be effective. On the left, some have focused on the threat of military action as another looming error of the Bushies. They want any such threats taken absolutely off the table. In truth, they should be rooting for Cheney and company's sabre rattling. Only if they are believed are the sanctions likely to be enacted that might stand a realistic chance of getting the attention of the Mullahs and Pres. Ahmadinejad.

Ahmadinejad: Are Americans Responsible For All Terror In Iraq?

In an interview broadcast this morning on ABC's Good Morning America, Iranian President Ahmadinejad responds with the following to one of Diane Sawyer's questions:

Ahmadinejad: … [Laughs] Well I think that you should check your source because people say different things. One of the interior ministry officials from Iran (sic) said that all of these terrors are done by American forces, and that was an official. He had an official position in Iraq.

Emphasis added.

Prior to this point, he also implies that the Bathist and Sunni insurgents attacking Shiites are American led:

Ahmadinejad: Let me ask you a question, those people who are killing the Shiites, are they organized by Americans?

Sawyer: Sunnis? Baathists?

Ahmadinejad: Anyone, anyone. Are the Baathists organized in Kuwait by Americans? Why do you say no? No, I am just asking you a question, who organizes them?

Note, he is being very playful with Sawyer, who he says at one point is, "only a journalist." He is just raising a question. He maintains full deniability about affirmatively making such accusations. And yet...it seems perfectly clear that he is reflecting the view of, if not himself, significant numbers of people in the middle east.

What then would happen in Iraq if, or more likely when, America withdraws. Will a Sunni/Shiite bloodbath ensue as many, including Andrew Sullivan predict? Sullivan argues in effect that such Muslim on Muslim terror will expose the perpetrators as simple murderers, not Islamic heroes battling the infidels.

But what if they are not so fanatical and stupid as we presume? Suppose, upon the departure of American troops they see that continuing terror bombings will expose there position as protectors of Islam against the West? The al Qaeda types will, I predict stop their suicide bombings. That, of course, will do nothing to halt the internecine warfare between Shi'a and Sunni, which is purely murderous, not fundamentally suicidal. Both sides will openly fight to establish their interests and geographic control with remote controlled bombs and death squads. Assistance from the Saudi's and Iranians will no doubt ensue at a large scale, until the conflict threatens to inflame the region and interfere with the flow of oil money to the pockets of both nations. Then peace conferences will be brokered and some tentative peace agreement instituted.

The deeply relevant question for America is what will be the tolerance in some newly peaceful Iraq for al Qaeda? Will their training bases and the flow of weapons and funds to their Iraqi bases be ignored by the government? Under those conditions will they prosper and grow, able to plan and execute new attacks on the West? If they do, what will be the realistic possibilities of US troops then in Kuwait or the Kurdish areas to re-invade central Iraq to quash the terrorists?

I think that our chances of successfully stopping them will be nil. Imagine the argument here about the then proffered evidence of al Qaeda growth and involvement in new attacks on Europe or America. Just look at the current wave of international and domestic doubt the US allegations of Iran being the source for new and effective IED weapons being used against American troops in Iraq. The legacy of Chenney and Rumsfeld. Also, wouldn't any newly "independent" Iraqi government oppose the reintroduction of US forces in any number back into their territory?

In short, if, as Democrats believe, we have just duly appointed Gen. Petraeus to engage in a fool's errand, the end of American involvement in Iraq is now in sight. The insurgent forces will fight mightily, especially via bombings killing as many American troops and Iraqi civilians as possible to assure reportage by the media that the "surge" is failing. We will depart, with or without our tails between our legs, and we will hunker down in the region and here at home awaiting the next attack. You can bet your house that the next President, of either party, will not instigate large scale military response to future attacks without crystal clear evidence and a target that will only require minimal, brief, overwhelming force, followed by a rapid exit. The enemy is not so foolish as to provide such a vulnerable paper trail.